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KENT GREENFIELD*
Corporate Ethics in a Devilish System
WHEN PARTICIPATING IN DISCUSSIONS OF CORPORATE ETHICS, I am often struck by
the narrowness of the discussion. Frequently, what many consider corporate ethics
is an insistence on compliance with law and a focus on various mechanisms for
keeping companies within the straight and narrow of legal boundaries.' I believe
this fixation on compliance with law is a constrained view of corporate ethics, and
this Essay will set out some reasons why.
Legal compliance is important, of course. Corporations are immensely powerful
economic entities, and management's respect for law is essential if companies are to
be operated in a way that is consistent with social welfare.' Moreover, as artificial
entities, corporations are not subject to the constraints of conscience and social
norm that limit the behavior of natural persons.' As I have written before, "it is
widely believed that corporate illegality and crime are 'imperfectly regulated by
social controls' because corporations cannot be incarcerated, have no conscience,
are typically very complex institutions, and are not subject to the same social con-
trols and reputational constraints as individuals."4
The emphasis on legal compliance is even more crucial because of the fact that a
small but significant portion of the corporate law academy does not appear to
deem it important as a goal in and of itself. Judge Frank Easterbrook and Professor
Daniel Fishel, for example, two of the leading scholars of the "nexus of contracts"
movement within corporate law, made a splash a number of years ago when they
suggested that the duty to obey the law is simply a constituent part of the duty to
. Professor of Law and Law Fund Research Scholar, Boston College Law School; Distinguished Faculty
Fellow, Center on Corporations, Law & Society, Seattle University School of Law.
1. See Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Compliance with the Law in the Era of Efficiency, 76 N.C. L. REV.
1265, 1375 (1998) (noting that with regard to corporate social responsibility, prominent scholars and practi-
tioners have emphasized the duty of corporate directors and officers to ensure legal compliance).
2. Patrick J. Ryan, Strange Bedfellows: Corporate Fiduciaries and the General Law Compliance Obligation in
Section 2.01 (a) of the American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance, 66 WASH. L. REV. 413, 417,
430-31 (1991).
3. Id. at 428-29 (arguing that corporations are complex organizations of various individuals whose spe-
cialization and incomplete knowledge make it more likely that the organization will behave unlawfully); see also
WILLIAM S. LAUFER, CORPORATE BODIES AND GUILTY MINDS: THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABIL-
ITY (2006).
4. Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality (With Notes on How
Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms), 87 VA. L. REV. 1279, 1289-90 (2001) (quoting Ryan,
supra note 2, at 417).
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maximize the firm's value.' They argued, "if illegality will profit the company more
than it will cost the company, the corporation should break the law. ' Additionally,
they wrote that "[m]anagers have no general obligation to avoid violating regula-
tory laws, when violations are profitable to the firm . . . ."' They also argued that
when a corporation determines whether illegality is likely to be profitable, the cost
that should be considered is not the actual penalty or fine; rather, it is the expected
penalty, fine, or other costs.' In essence, a corporation should consider the cost of
illegality as the penalty, fine, or other costs discounted by the chance of the expo-
sure of the corporation's illegality.9 The law, in other words, merely imposes a price
for illegal behavior.' ° If the corporation is willing to pay, then no problem with
illegality exists."
Critics disapprove of this belief in the non -distinctiveness of illegal behavior,
which is, thankfully, not the majority view within the academy" or in the courts. 3
Without doubt, compliance with law is crucial, and those who make it their life's
work to ensure that corporations comply with the law deserve congratulations and
support.
But a dedication to legality standing alone is hardly a robust sense of ethics,
corporate or otherwise. If I were to teach my son that being ethical means simply to
obey the rules, then I would be offering impoverished and limited guidance.'4 Eth-
ics means more than obeying the law.'5 If that is so, why do so many discussions of
5. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender Offers, 80 MICH. L.
REV. 1155, 1177 (1982) ("Corporations are not privileges; a corporation is no more than a convenient name for
a nexus of contractual relationships *among people .... When the corporation is properly seen as a summary of
a set of contractual relationships, it becomes difficult, probably impossible, to say that the agents (managers)
may take it on themselves to define the responsibility of the firm.").
6. Id. at 1168 n.36.
7. Id. at 1168 n.36, 1177 n.57 ("[Mianagers not only may but also should violate the rules when it is
profitable to do so.").
8. See id. at 1158.
9. See id. For an excellent discussion, see Williams, supra note 1, at 1279-80.
10. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5, at 1158.
11. See id.
12. For a review of the literature on point and an extensive critique of the Easterbrook & Fischel view, see
Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives!, supra note 4; Williams, supra note 1. For a more recent discussion of mechanisms
to control corporate illegality, see Adam Sulkowski & Kent Greenfield, A Bridle, a Prod, and a Big Stick: An
Evaluation of Class Actions, Shareholder Proposals, and the Ultra Vires Doctrine as Methods for Controlling Corpo-
rate Behavior, 79 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 929 (2005).
13. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369 (Del. 2006) (citing In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906
A.2d 27, 66 (Del. 2006)) (discussing the obligation to obey the law as a component of the duty of good faith);
In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 968 (Del. Ch. 1996) (discussing the obligation of
management to erect an internal reporting system to aid management in ensuring that the company is comply-
ing with applicable laws).
14. And even this guidance occasionally would be wrong because some rules should be disobeyed, as a
matter of ethics. See Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from a Birmingham Jail (Apr. 16, 1963), available at http://
www.stanford.edu/group/Kinglfrequentdocs/birmingham.pdf ("[O]ne has a moral responsibility to disobey
unjust laws.").
15. Merriam-Webster defines "ethics" as "the discipline dealing with what is good and bad and with moral
duty and obligation." Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionaryleth-
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corporate ethics begin and end in consideration of the law and how to ensure that
corporations obey it? The reason is that it is difficult to expect businesses and the
people within them to do more, given the legal framework we impose on them.
I should pause to admit an underlying assumption here: that situation more than
disposition drives the behavior of most people. 6 An individual's motivations occur
within a framework of incentives and disincentives, and individuals are affected by
their surroundings and by myriad influences. 7 Despite our best intentions, and
despite what many of us assume about our own behavior and by those around us,
we make decisions less because of some inner compass than by the pushes and
pulls of situation.
This is especially true of corporate executives (not to mention the corporations
themselves). The "role morality" of executives, created by law and norm, creates for
them the overarching and urgent goal of producing financial returns for sharehold-
ers, focused in the short term.' That goal subordinates other matters. 9 If execu-
tives wanted to act beyond that role in a way they thought their ethical system
required, they might be able to on the edges.2" For the most part, however, their
obligations to their company and their shareholders, enforced by law and the mar-
ket, keep them acting within narrow bounds."
ics (last visited Feb. 15, 2008); see also Note, Finding Strategic Corporate Citizenship: A New Game Theoretic
View, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1957, 1958 (2004) ("The words 'ethics' and 'responsibility' connote selflessness and
altruism, internalizing a concept of charity without expectation of payback.").
16. For accessible and persuasive treatments of the dispositionalist-situationist debate, see Adam
Benforado et al., Broken Scales: Obesity and Justice in America, 53 EMORY L.J. 1645 (2004); Jon Hanson &
Kathleen Hanson, The Blame Frame: Justifying (Racial) Injustice in America, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413
(2006); Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical Real-
ism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129 (2003) [hereinafter Hanson & Yosifon, The
Situation]; Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Critical Realist Perspective on the Human
Animal, 93 GEo. L.J. 1 (2004). Also very helpful is the blog The Situationist, http://thesituation-
ist.wordpress.com (last visited Mar. 10, 2008) (created by Ion Hanson and Michael McCann).
17. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 16, at 136-38.
18. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, Cooperation and Constraint in the Modem Corporation: An Inquiry into the
Causes of Corporate Immorality, 73 TEx. L. REV. 477, 501 (1995) (discussing the role morality of corporate
executives).
19. id.
20. Id. at 522. The business judgment rule provides deference to the decisions of company directors. This
deference offers flexibility to the executives to make decisions in a more ethically robust way, as long as they
rationally can claim that their actions are in the long-term interests of the company. See, e.g., Shlensky v.
Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (Il1. App. Ct. 1968) (giving deference to management's decision not to install
lights at the Chicago Cubs park, even though every other Major League Baseball franchise had done so, for the
putative reason that neighborhood decay brought about by nighttime games would hurt the team in the long
run). John Nilson and I have argued that the business judgment rule is a necessary ameliorative to the single-
minded demand to maximize profit. See Kent Greenfield & John E. Nilson, Gradgrind's Education: Using Dick-
ens and Aristotle to Understand (and Replace?) the Business Judgment Rule, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 799, 842 (1997).
21. Mitchell, supra note 18, at 522. For an analysis of the limitations of the business judgment rule in
offering freedom to corporate executives, see Kent Greenfield, Reclaiming Corporate Law in a New Gilded Age, 2
HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 1 (2008) [hereinafter Greenfield, Gilded Age].
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In this view, failures of corporate ethics are not matters of bad people acting
within and through business. Rather they are failures of the system itself. Let me
explain.
There are many views of what constitutes the substance of ethical or moral be-
havior.2 Whether one takes guidance from religious norms or from Rawls, Kant,
Aristotle or other philosophical thinkers, there are significant areas of agreement as
to what amounts to ethical behavior. If my son asked me what ethics really means
(and I try to tell him these things even when he does not ask), I would encourage
him to think about the obligations of acting with due care for others, of taking
responsibility for the effect of one's actions, of being honest, of considering broadly
one's impacts, and of taking a long-term view, especially with regard to resource
use.
Corporate law and financial markets operate to make these ethical obligations
difficult to satisfy in a business setting. Limited liability, for example, the very
cornerstone of corporate law,2" is inconsistent with the ethical norm of taking re-
sponsibility for one's own actions since it shields people from liability that arises
from their wrongful conduct.24 Limited liability is fundamental and indeed is a
principal reason that businesses choose to incorporate.2" Moreover, corporations
create subsidiaries through which they can perform risky operations, in part be-
cause the parent can shield assets from any potential liability.26 There may be strong
reasons to support limited liability in order to incentivize business creation and
capital formation. Certainly, however, this has ethical implications and should be
subject to an ethical critique, especially if it allows companies to shield themselves
from taking financial responsibility for harms they cause.27
22. For a sampling of the many views on the substance of ethical or moral behavior, consult religious
writings such as the Bible, the Qu'ran, the Talmud, and the Veda. See also ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN
ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE (Sir David Ross trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1975) (1925) (focusing on the development of
a balanced moral character and one's affirmative choice to engage in consistent virtuous conduct); IMMANUEL
KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Allen W. Wood ed. and trans., Yale Univ. Press
2002) (reasoning that moral behavior is such only if it is motivated exclusively by good will); JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (invoking social contract theory to argue that moral behavior on the societal level is
achieved through a recognition of inviolable basic liberties and equality of opportunity).
23. Nina A. Mendelson, A Controller-Based Approach to Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 1203, 1208-09 (2002).
24. See id. at 1204.
25. Id. at 1208-09.
26. Lynn M. LoPucki, Virtual Judgment Proofing: A Rejoinder, 107 YALE L.J. 1413, 1427 (1998) ("Limiting
liability is widely understood to be the principal reason for the separate incorporation of subsidiaries.").
27. The scholarship on limited liability and its implications is extensive. For a taste, see LAWRENCE E.
MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA'S NEWEST EXPORT (2001) (describing the moral hazards
arising from limited liability); Theresa Gabaldon, Experiencing Limited Liability: On Insularity and Inbreeding
on Corporate Law, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 111-37 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995); Mendelson,
supra note 23. But see Steven Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L. 479 (2001) (providing an
argument to justify limited liability regimes while suggesting that corporate veil piercing should be con-
strained); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts,
100 YALE L.J. 1879 (1991).
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The expectations for corporate executives also contradict the ethical obligation
of honesty. To be sure, there is a massive legal framework built up to protect
shareholders from fraud, and consumer and creditor protections also exist.2" But
employees are not protected by anti-fraud law on the federal or state level.29 If the
CEO goes to a shareholder meeting and lies about financial projections, it can be a
federal crime.3 ° If she then appears in the employee lunchroom and utters the same
lie, not only is it not a violation of law, it may in fact be consistent with (or re-
quired by) her fiduciary duty to maximize shareholder value. 1
The imperative that corporate managers take a narrow and short-term view of
their obligations is also ethically problematic. Those executives who think broadly
about their obligations or want to offer fair and proportionate "returns" to stake-
holders other than equity investors are routinely punished by the market-they
suffer criticism by Wall Street, sometimes suits by the plaintiffs bar, and sometimes
takeover.32 An executive that causes the company to act in the long term, to take
into consideration the interests of stakeholders other than shareholders, or will-
ingly to accept lower profit in order to avoid imposing costly externalities on soci-
ety at large will appear, from the viewpoint of shareholders and their Wall Street
protectors, to be under-performing.33 To the extent that ethics imposes costs or
lengthens the time horizon-something that ethics by its own terms is bound to
do-it is unsustainable unless we change the system in which we ask corporate
28. See generally Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.) The purpose of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is to protect share-
holders by improving corporate disclosure regulations. For a more substantive discussion of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act's protective provisions, see J. Brent Wilkins, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: The Ripple Effects of
Restoring Shareholder Confidence, 29 S. ILL. U. L.J. 339 (2005).
29. See generally KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS & PROGRES-
SIVE POSSIBILITIES (2006) [hereinafter GREENFIELD, FAILURE] (arguing for federal fraud protection for employ-
ees); Kent Greenfield, The Unjustified Absence of Federal Fraud Protection in the Labor Market, 107 YALE L.J. 715
(1997) (suggesting a potential federal statutory scheme to protect the labor market in the same way that federal
anti-fraud regulation protects the capital markets).
30. Various cases have been brought against corporate directors alleging violations of federal securities
laws when the corporation lies or conceals financial projections to shareholders. See, e.g., Grossman v. Novell,
Inc., 120 F.3d 1112 (10th Cir. 1997); Provenz v. Miller, 102 F.3d 1478, 1487 (9th Cir. 1996) ("A (financial]
projection is a 'factual' misstatement [actionable under securities law] 'if (1) the statement is not actually
believed, (2) there is no reasonable basis for the belief, or (3) the speaker is aware of undisclosed facts tending
seriously to undermine the statement's accuracy.'"); Plaine v. McCabe, 797 F.2d 713, 723 (9th Cir. 1986)
(noting that allegations of misrepresentation or failure to disclose specific items, including financial projec-
tions, from tender offer documents sufficiently stated a claim for violations of federal law).
31. See Robert C. Clark, Major Changes Lead Us Back to Basics (A Response to the Symposium on My
Treatise), 31 J. CORP. L. 591, 596-97 (2006) (explaining the fiduciary duty to maximize shareholder value).
32. See Shimko v. E. States Corp., 146 A.2d 891, 892 (Md. 1958) (addressing suit by shareholders to
compel the corporation to pay dividends when there was a two million dollar surplus, and the corporation
claimed it would use as part of a long-term recapitalization plan). See generally Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170
N.W. 668, 685 (Mich. 1919) (awarding payment of dividends to shareholders on the grounds that withholding
payment to increase the welfare of the general public was not in the best interests of the corporation and
shareholders).
33. See Dodge, 170 N.W. at 679, 683, 685 (explaining how Ford Motor Co.'s non-payment policy was
viewed to be under-performing).
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executives to work. We would need to adjust the obligations of their roles to in-
clude, at least, the possibility and, more appropriately, the obligation to act in an
ethically robust way.
I recognize that short-termism is an evil that many have started to speak out
against, including representatives of corporate management such as the Chamber
of Commerce and the Business Roundtable. 4 Sarbanes-Oxley plays into this oppo-
sition, in fact, since it is now more difficult for managers to use accounting manip-
ulation to hide efforts on their part to manage for the long term.35 In other words,
to satisfy short-term Wall Street expectations, managers were formerly able to ma-
nipulate more easily the financial disclosures from quarter to quarter without actu-
ally managing for the short term. 6 It is a very real possibility that one of the
unintended consequences of Sarbanes-Oxley's stricter reporting standards is that
now in order to appear to manage in the short term, one must actually manage for
the short term.
Many have argued that the responsibilities of Sarbanes-Oxley should be relaxed."
There may be some merit to this argument with regard to specific provisions, but a
general trend toward fewer responsibilities is not one that I would applaud. On the
contrary, I believe we ought to impose more rather than fewer responsibilities on
management and use the law to make our ethical norms real and impactful. If the
corporations, as institutions, are indeed without consciences-the prototypical
Holmesian "Bad Man" 3-and corporate managers are limited by their role moral-
ity, then the way to make corporate ethics more than a public relations gimmick is
to embody them in law.
What would such an ethical system of corporate law look like? If ethics is taking
responsibility for one's actions, considering broadly one's actions, being honest,
and taking the long-term view, then we could change corporate law in realistic and
34. See Lee Drutman, The Long-Term Value Moment, AM. PROSPECT, July 9, 2007, http://
www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=thejlongterm_value-moment (cataloging various studies pointing out the
pathologies of short-termism in the business strategy).
35. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 101-09, 116 Stat. 745, 750-71 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201-19 (Supp. V 2006)).
36. See Drutman, supra note 34.
37. See Peter K.M. Chan, Breaking the Market's Dependence on Independence: An Alternative to the "Inde-
pendent" Outside Auditor, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FiN. L. 347, 349 (2004) (arguing that the auditing restrictions
in Sarbanes-Oxley should be relaxed); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE l..J. 1521, 1602 (2005) (arguing that because of the haste under which
Sarbanes-Oxley was enacted, the Act does not appropriately serve the corporate world's needs and should be
relaxed); Stephen Labaton, Investors' Suits Face Higher Bar, Justices Rule, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2007, at Al
(reporting that industry groups and allies in academia have urged the Bush Administration and Congress to
make it more difficult for investors to bring lawsuits against corporations and to relax some of the provisions of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002).
38. Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., Justice, Supreme Judicial Court of Mass., The Path of the Law, Remarks at the
Dedication of the new hall of the Boston University School of Law (Jan. 8, 1897), in 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 459
(1897) ("If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only for the
material consequences.").
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meaningful ways to make those norms more realizable in the corporate context. We
could change corporate governance to give those contributors to the firm who do
not own stock-employees, communities, other stakeholders-some ability to have
their views heard and considered within the governance of the firm. Bringing the
views of non-shareholder stakeholders into the governance of the firm would not
only make it more likely that the corporation will consider broadly the impacts of
its decisions, it also will-because shareholders tend to have a very short time hori-
zon 39 -necessarily cause the firm to take a longer-term view of its decisions and
strategies. Such inclusion will also cause corporations to internalize more of the
costs of their decisions. In addition, the law should require corporations to tell the
truth not only to shareholders and consumers, but to employees as well.
The market, by itself, will not cause companies to act this way. Of course, some
companies do try to take into account the long-term interests of a broader group of
stakeholders, to beneficial effect.4" But most do not for several reasons. The long-
term benefits are either not recognized, not deemed important, or not internalized
into the decision-making of the firm.41 Shareholders elect boards, and the law
makes shareholders supreme.42 Few directors or managers have the incentive to
push their firms to take what must seem a huge short-term risk-reallocating more
decision-making power to non-equity investors-for gains that seem abstract or
beyond the time horizon for shareholders.4 3 The law must overcome this "sticki-
ness" of the status quo.
39. The average stock turnover for Fortune 500 companies is over 100% a year, and is even greater for
smaller companies. LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY: How FINANCE TRIUMPHED OVER
INDUSTRY 277-78 (2007).
40. See generally RAJENDRA S. SISODIA ET AL., FIRMS OF ENDEARMENT: How WORLD CLASS COMPANIES
PROFIT FROM PASSION AND PURPOSE (2007) (arguing that stakeholder management results in market
successes).
41. But see Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law: The Legitimating Schemas of Modern Policy
and Corporate Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1, 46-48 (2004) (discussing the "shareholder primacy" theory of the
corporation where if one takes a long-term view of shareholders' interests, advancing the concerns of other
corporate constituents may serve to enhance shareholder value); David Locasio, Comment, The Dilemma of the
Double Derivative Suit, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 729, 758 (1989) (explaining that, under Delaware law, the business
judgment rule affords corporate directors broad discretion in their decision-making that enables them to con-
sider the long-term interests of shareholders (citing Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000 (N.Y. 1979)).
42. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 959 (Del. 1985) (discussing the benefits of a
corporate model where the shareholders elect the members of the board: "If the stockholders are displeased
with the action of their elected representatives, the powers of corporate democracy are at their disposal to turn
the board out.").
43. There are many factors that have led companies to focus on equity-driven investors and short-term
gains instead of allocating decisions based on long-term growth and giving power to non-equity investors. See,
e.g., Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate Governance: The Quinquennial Election
of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 205-13 (1991) (discussing how competition among institutional investors
can lead corporations to focus on short-term gains which can threaten the long-term health of a company).
Because of this, the long-term interests of the shareholders might actually be weakened. Thomas Lee Hazen,
The Short-Term/Long-Term Dichotomy and Investment Theory: Implications for Securities Market Regulation and
for Corporate Law, 70 N.C. L. REV. 137, 179 (1991) ("Although not all observers agree, many have suggested
that corporate managers' obsession with short-term shareholder wealth maximization has, in many cases, di-
verted their attention away from the efficient operation of their companies.").
VOL. 3 NO. 2 2008
CORPORATE ETHICS IN A DEVILISH SYSTEM
One concern often expressed is that a more robust system of stakeholder govern-
ance will impose large and unsustainable costs on the United States economy, espe-
cially in an increasingly globalized world economy." The answer to this concern
begins with the notion that employee (and stakeholder) involvement in manage-
ment is compatible with business success. As I have discussed at length elsewhere,
as employees feel more "ownership" in their firm, they will work harder, contribute
more ideas, improve their productivity, malinger less, and obey company rules
more.' This will tend to improve company profitability over time. The more diffi-
cult competitiveness critique to answer is not that individual firms will fail if they
take into account the interests of stakeholders, but that capital (i.e., shareholders)
will flee U.S. markets if a stakeholder governance framework is established. 6 It is
true that recognizing a stakeholder framework might bring about a reallocation of
the corporate surplus away from shareholders and toward other stakeholders. That
is part of the objective of such a framework. But as the stakeholder model creates
gains for the corporation as a whole, then the slice of the pie going to shareholders
may grow in an absolute sense, even if it is not as large in a comparative sense.
The judgment of capital is always a relative one-"will I make more if I invest
here or elsewhere?"-so a stakeholder corporate governance regime will only cause
capital to flee if it can find a better risk/return mix elsewhere. Given the power and
stability of U.S. markets, there are very few places likely to offer a better risk/return
ratio. Europe's current corporate governance framework is more protective of
stakeholders than any regime the U.S. is likely to enact, making it unlikely that
capital will flee to Europe. 7 Indeed, the fact that Europe has such a robust system
of stakeholder protection while maintaining healthy and competitive capital mar-
kets is an indication that there is little reason to worry that capital will abandon
ship if the U.S. adopts a similar model.4"
All of this is to say that if we, collectively, desire corporations and their manage-
ment to behave more ethically in any genuine sense, we have the tools at our dispo-
sal to bring that about. Those tools are legal tools, changing the nature of the
44. See Ethan S. Burger, Who Is the Corporation's Lawyer?, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 711, 741-42 (2005) (ex-
plaining the two common theories of stakeholder governance and noting that the stakeholder model results in
difficulty in sustaining competitiveness because of the increasing globalization of the economy).
45. See GREENFIELD, FAILURE, supra note 29. For a broad overview of the debate on the effectiveness of
employee ownership, see generally Henry Hansmann, When Does Worker Ownership Work? ESOPS, Law Firms,
Codetermination, and Economic Dependency, 99 YALE L.J. 1749 (1990) (describing employee ownership in vari-
ous employment contexts and its benefits and costs).
46. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future As History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Gov-
ernance and its Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 641 (1999) (examining the various types of stakeholder govern-
ance both in the United States and abroad, and discussing the implications of each, the reasons for the disparity
between countries in governance standards, and how adopting various forms of stakeholder governance specifi-
cally could impact the United States).
47. See Luca Enriques, Bad Apples, Bad Oranges: A Comment From Old Europe on Post-Enron Corporate
Governance Reforms, 38 WAKE FoREST L. REV. 911 (2003) (discussing European corporate governance and
stakeholder protection in the context of the Enron collapse).
48. For a more extensive answer to this critique, see Greenfield, Gilded Age, supra note 21.
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obligations of the firm and of its management. The current corporate governance
framework constrains management to act in ways that we would deem unethical if
conducted in other areas of life. We cannot expect people to act as Saints in a
devilish system.
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